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The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of how a phenomenon or process of collective action with regard to the negotiation in value capturing can be expected to happen in a certain way, which in the end could improve our understanding of value capturing implementation processes.

Game theory is utilized to model the structure of relations between the actors involved. Game theory is a mathematical approach to study collective decision‐making situations in which the decision makers involved have conflicting preferences. Here, the authors consider the implementation of value capturing as the result of an agreement between a municipality and landowners to contribute to the costs of public infrastructure development which, in essence, is a form of collective action.

The paper is not only demonstrating the usefulness of game theoretical modelling in conceptualising relations between different stakeholders in the implementation of value capturing and suggesting the best possible strategy for every stakeholder; but also observing the limitations of the methods in analyzing the behaviour of actors involved in decision‐making processes with respect to value capturing.

Unlike most of value capturing studies which focused on either a valuation point of view (how much value can be captured?), a governance or instrumentalist point of view (which instruments can be effective for value capturing?), or a political point of view (to whom belongs the increment value that is the result of government investments or decisions?) – this paper emphasizes an alternative perspective to value capturing, namely the decision‐making or negotiation process underlying value capturing by relying on game‐theoretical approach.

This article aims at analysing the different institutional aspects of the rural land market that are manifest at the transactional level. Second, it answers the question whether including these aspects in a land price model increases the understanding of rural land market outcomes. Institutional economics scholars have challenged the limited institutional behaviour of conventional land market models. Despite their research methods remaining primarily qualitative, research findings suggest that we should look at institutional aspects to understand land and real estate market outcomes better.

This paper presents a hedonic price model explaining rural land prices by using individual institutional transaction aspects from the deeds of purchase of the land exchange.

The results indicate that incorporating institutional aspects, such as property rights, transactional arrangements and governance context, as explanatory variables significantly improves the power of the model.

The approach taken in this article is new in the sense that it tries to combine a quantitative research method with a rich data set of a more qualitative character. The use of deeds of purchase as a primary source of a hedonic price model is relatively new and provides a first step in bridging the gap between advanced hedonic land price models and rich institutional economic insights in market processes.

Urban decline is a much‐researched topic in both urban and real estate literature. Yet, there is no generally accepted measurable indicator for decline. This paper starts to fill this void. The purpose of this paper is threefold: to better understand the process of decline of one particular urban area, industrial estates; based on that, to identify a possible indicator for decline; and to take a first step in the empirical testing of the suitability of this indicator.

Building on a review of the literature on definitions of urban decline, and inspired by hedonic price models, the average property value per hectare is identified as a promising indicator for urban decline. Drawing on hedonic price studies explaining the value of individual industrial property, the paper subsequently distinguishes a number of independent variables likely to influence the average property value of an urban area. The paper uses a simple OLS regression to test whether the relation between these independent variables and average property value is in line with expectations.

The analysis shows that nearly all independent variables have the expected effect on average property values of industrial estates. From this the authors conclude that constructing an indicator for decline based on the average property value of an urban area can prove fruitful to measure decline.

The decline of industrial estates, as a particular type of urban area, has not received much attention in the international real estate literature. Furthermore, the identification of average property value as an indicator for the decline of urban areas is new.